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Abstract: Are women in a patriarchal society like Togo as competitive as men? How does being 
a parent, in a polygamous vs. monogamous marriage and having high income affect one’s 
willingness to compete? With an incentivized experiment, we explore whether there are gender 
differences in selecting into competitive environments, especially when the incentives switch 
from cash to voucher. This experiment is conducted in Togo, West Africa, with 428 subjects 
including females-males, parent-non parent. Overall, the findings reveal no significant 
differences between the females and males’ willingness to compete. Female parents are more 
competitive than male parents regardless of the incentive. Subjects in polygamous marriages are 
competitive relative to subjects in monogamous marriages. Finally, we found no evidence of a 
differential effects of income on the willingness to compete of subjects.    
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1. Introduction  
It is evident that social differentiation by gender is a fundamental phenomenon that affects every 
aspect of individuals' daily lives (Bussey K. & Bandura A. 1999). The contemptuous difference 
between men and women maintains a persistence of disparities between genders, which induces 
prejudicial attitudes throughout society. However, gender is merely considered constructed 
cultural construct (see Golombok & Fivush, 1994). Although there may be some inherent 
biological differences between women and men (Ehrhardt, Meyer-Bahlberg, Feldman, & Ince, 
1984; Urdry 1994), how cultures define, classify, and value these differences influence the 
expressions of the changes in behavior related to gender (Markus & Oyserman, 1989).  
Despite efforts of awareness and the promotion of women’s rights to compete at the same 
tables of educational and professional excellence as men, and despite the improvements recorded 
in the female education enrollment rate, there is still a consistency in the gaps between the 
considerations and the treatment attributed to women and men. The gender gap is not only 
observed in wage payments but also on the prospects for careers advancement (e.g. Gneezy, 
Leonard & List, 2008). For example, among Fortune 500 companies, women comprise only 4.8 
percent of CEOs, 14.6 percent of executive officers, and 16.9 percent of board members (Catalyst 
2014). In some societies women are chiefly responsible for child rearing, familial, and domestic 
tasks regardless of their employment (Chafetz J.S. 1998). Also, in some companies, women face 
unpaid maternal leave and can even, in some cases, lose their jobs definitively due to pregnancies 
or family responsibilities.  
It is evident that gender differences in competition have some evolutionary and 
sociocultural explanations, which are not unique to humans. Enthused by evolutionary biology, 
and sociology, recent experimental studies starting with Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) 
suggest a third explanation: “Men are more strongly motivated by competitive incentives or more 
effective in competitive environments than women,” thus impeding women in competitions to 
receive promotions or get new jobs. Competitiveness is measured as the performance response to 
a competitive setting instead of non-competitive setting (Cardenas, Dreber, Essen, & Ranehill, 
2012). Recent work by Cassar, Wordofa & Zhang (2016) suggests that gender differences in 
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competition diminish significantly with the incentives given to individuals. Drawing from their 
work, this study uses the same experimental design to examine the deeply held belief that varies 
across societies on women’s competitive behavior. In matrilineal societies, the central belief is that 
women are equally or even more competitive than men. In patriarchal societies, where women 
appropriate roles are limited within the household, women are less competitive than men. In order 
to measure the competitive behavior of both genders, this study analyzes the willingness to 
compete of men and women under monetary and non-monetary incentives. To the understanding 
of the gender differences in competition, we also present an analysis on the income and the 
marriage type (polygamy, monogamy) on the attitude of both genders willingness to compete. The 
goal of this work is to gain a better understanding of the factors that influence the decision making 
of genders, and therefore help shed light on the disparities in organizational outcomes. Taking into 
account all these aspects, the findings of this study will also indicate the importance of cultural 
norms in driving gender disparities, as well as opening the door for policy interventions to address 
them. 
  The study is conducted in Togo (West Africa). The demographics of Togo notes two major 
groups that make up the bulk of its workforce. By groups, we are referring to Togo’s youth and 
female population. Togolese women have a reputation of great entrepreneurs in the history of the 
country. They are known for their contributions in the business world of trade. These business 
women are referred to as the “Nana-Benz” or simply known as the “Nana”. The “Nanas” are 
women who “degender” themselves from social gender norm attributes to take on masculine roles 
for success.  
The data collection is done in two-time periods (Summer 2016 & Winter 2017). Together, 
the experiment is performed with 428 participants: both male and female, parent and non-parent. 
The results of this experiment reveal some fascinating facts about differences in competition 
between genders. Although this society is patriarchal, females in both the cash and voucher 
incentives are as competitive as the males. Female parents are more competitive than the male 
parents irrespective of the treatment. Moreover, polygamous marriages show to have some impact 
on competitiveness, where people, especially females in this type of marriage reveal to be most 
competitive. The results do not provide evidence to conclude a significant effect of income on 
individual’s willingness to compete.  
2. Societal background 
 4 
 Located in the west part of Africa, the Togolese are a classic representation of a patriarchal 
society. According to traditions, the family life has to be organized around the father’s house. A 
woman is required to leave her household and join the household of her husband’s family. 
Meanwhile a man never leaves his home to join a woman’s household. A man is considered the 
head of the family regardless of his financial status. Men have to pay for a woman’s dowry and 
are also required to be the primary provider for their families. They, take care of all financial 
decisions. In the absence of her husband, a woman needs to seek permission from an elder male, 
before she makes any decision.  
However, in the same society, there is a group of women, who are known not to follow 
these patriarchal traditional patterns. These women are called the “Nana Benz”. The term “Nana,” 
is commonly used in Togo to refer to wealthy female, cloth merchants, and by extension wealthy 
businesswomen. Their ownership of Mercedes Benz cars, which people could not afford at the 
time, was evidence of their success stories from the mid-1950’s through1980’s. This is how they 
acquired the name “Nana Benz”. The government used to hire their Mercedes Benz for important 
guests and state functions. Although many were uneducated, the Nana Benz of Togo, made their 
brand internationally by trading in wax printed cloth starting in the 1930’s, before the 
independence of the country.  They started from nothing and ended up being among the country’s 
richest citizens.  They imported the cloth from Dutch companies in Indonesia. Between 1976 and 
1984, at least 40% of the commercial business in Togo which was in the informal sector, was in 
the hands of the “Nana Benz”. During the 1970’s, the scope of this trade in textile was so important 
that it exceeded Togo’s phosphate industry, the country’s primary source of revenue (African 
Queens of Textiles 2012). According to the African Queens of Textiles (2012), it is important to 
note that a woman did not become a “Nana Benz” through inheritance, or society’s choice, but 
through ingenuity, and struggle. 
Due to their resistance against the cultural norms of the appropriate role of the woman, a 
persistent legend accuses them of co-habiting with multiple partners, a kind of reversed polygamy. 
Another speculation based on local beliefs imputes magical practices to them and the possession 
of occult powers that have brought them success in business and amassed great wealth (Rivière 
1973). To ensure that their economic success is socially recognized, they “degender” themselves 
and take on masculine attributes in a society that proudly upholds a commonly shared, standardized 
machismo. They can be matched to the evaluation made by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch (1994) 
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of the Amazons of Dahomey: “They thus reject the traditional gender condition, but are proud to 
be extraordinary women.” The Nana Benz are also attributed the same success criteria as men. 
Another masculine attribute associated with these businesswomen is that they finance household 
expenses and educate their children in the best schools in the country or abroad. It is generally 
thought that they exercise the real authority at home, a role traditionally rendered to the husband 
(Toulabor 2012). 
Inspired by their mothers, today, the Togolese society is once again faced with a new 
generation of the “Nanas”, which took over the trade market. This time its majority consists of the 
daughters from the powerful ladies who have stood for a long time in the Togolese economy. This 
new generation is no longer referred to as the Nana-Benz, but just “Nana,” due to the fact that 
Mercedes cars are now affordable for most of the people. Today, due to the competition and the 
economic situation, the heirs of the “Nana” are not only content from the sale of cloths, but are 
also starting in the marketing of manufactured goods, vehicles and products of first necessity (Les 
Nana Benz 2012).  
3. Literature Review  
A large body of research documents elaborate important gender differences in competition, 
and most findings suggest that these observed gaps between genders result in the difference in the 
willingness to compete of men and women (Niderle & Vedsterlund 2007). However, though there 
are some controversies in the findings, one stylized fact emerging from the literature is that men 
are more likely to self-select into environments that involve competition than women, as opposed 
to individualistic incentive schemes (Andersen, Steffen, Ertac, Gneezy, List, and Maximiano 
2013). This section of the paper focuses on the different advanced explanations of the persistent 
gender gap through the channels of evolutionary biology, sociology and experimental economics.  
1. Evolutionary biology perspectives 
 Several works in evolutionary biology and sociobiology realm explain differences in 
competitiveness between males and females in many species (Tregenza & Wedell 2002). One of 
the first constructed theories, which account for the gender differences in competition is Charles 
Darwin's (1871) biological theory referred to as the sexual selection. Darwin identified sexual 
selection as the process by which the members of one sex, generally males, compete for 
reproduction access with members of the opposite sex, usually females. Furthermore, he argued 
that the sexual selection is a much stronger evolutionary force in polygamous than in monogamous 
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mating systems. Hence, such a choice would fall primarily on the male. On the other hand, because 
males are observed to have less contribution to their children’s survival chances, they tend to be 
more selective of their mate and therefore have multiple partners. Females have a lot of 
responsibilities when it comes to their children’s survival. Intrigued by this observation, in 1972, 
Trivers through the channel of parental investment in children takes the evolutionary theory a step 
further, from which he also derived that males are more competitive than females. Females adapt 
to their greater imposed role in reproduction and parenting by preferring fewer sexual partners, 
while males attempt to maximize the likelihood of paternity by reproducing with many females 
(Bussey & Bandural 1999).  
2. Sociology perspectives  
Unlike to the evolutionary theory, sociologists explain the differences in gender through 
the endorsement of social behavior attributed to both men and women. It is therefore important to 
acknowledge that these gender differences in competition are also controlled by contextual factors, 
such as situations and places in which men and women happen to find themselves. According to 
the social role theory, prescribed norms for femininity are inconsistent with behaviors, such as a 
leadership or competitiveness, that are connected with career progression (Heilman 2001). In 
general, women's traditional domestic and relational roles require collectivist traits and behaviors. 
By contrast, success in the competitive job market typically requires men to enact individualistic 
traits (Cuddy, Wolf, Glick, Crotty, Chong, & Norton, 2015). The inconsistency between the 
prescribed and required roles of women leads to the backlash effect (Rudman 1998), which states 
that when women show agentic behaviors, they may be seen as socially deficient, liked less, and 
be discriminated against (Rudman & Glick 2001). Therefore, to abide by the norms of their 
societies, and in order not to be rejected, typically women decide not to compete. 
3. Experimental economics perspectives 
Inspired by the theories, numerous studies are now being conducted in the field of 
economics. To help explain the gender differences in competition, economists analyze various 
aspects which can potentially trigger or impact such phenomenon.  
 3.1 Nature or Nurture  
According to Savikhon (2011) studies of competitiveness in children help illuminate the 
nature of the gender gap. They pinpoint whether the willingness to compete is a learned or an 
inherent human trait and thus provide evidence for how the willingness to compete evolves over 
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time. Gender differences in competitive environments are found to build on earlier evidence 
suggesting that boys are more familiar to competitive environments than girls. This view is also 
associated with social learning. Through an experiment with 3 to 8-year-old children in Germany, 
Sutter and Rutzler (2010) found that gender gap emerges early in life, from the age of 5, but it is 
not present in younger children. Similarly, but in terms of performance, Gneezy and Rustichini 
(2004) analyze the response of Israeli fourth-graders to competitive environments. They found that 
introducing a competitive aspect to running races cause the boys to perform better, but has no 
effect on the performance of girls.  
3.2 Effects of tasks in competition 
Men and women differ in their approach and completion of different goals. Most findings 
demonstrate that women underperform in competitive environments or decide not to compete at 
all. Researches show that the underperformance and reluctance toward competing from women 
may be the result of the tasks given to them to accomplish. There exist a division in the type of job 
a woman and a man can perform. In most societies, when a woman is acknowledged to be 
successful at performing male gender-typed work, she is by definition thought to have the 
attributes necessary to execute the tasks efficiently. However, these are the same attributes which 
are perceived as violations of gender norms. This shows that, although there is a good fit between 
what women are perceived to be like and the requirement of jobs, there is a bad fit for women’s 
gendered perception and the conception of how they should behave (Heilman, Wallen, Fucshs, & 
Tamkins, 2004). Studies on competitiveness differences using two tasks with varying gender 
associations; a “male” oriented task based on mathematical ability and a “female” oriented task 
based on verbal ability among adolescents show that although there is no significance difference 
in the task performance, adolescent boys and girls are equally likely to self-select into competition 
in a verbal task. However, boys are significantly more likely to choose to compete in a 
mathematical task (Dreber, Essen & Ranehill 2013; Nosek & Smyth 2011).  
3.3 Effects of culture in competition 
Similar patterns hold in other competitive contexts such as cultural contextual factors. In 
theory, contextual factors that weaken gender norms should moderate gender differences in 
decision to enter competition. Contexts in which prescriptive gender norms for women are not 
violated, or violated to a lesser extent should mitigate their general aversion for competition 
(Hanek, Kathrin, Stephen, & Avishalom 2016). Hofstede (1998), argue that there is gender 
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difference accentuation in masculine countries. For example, fathers in masculine cultures are said 
to deal with facts and, mothers with feelings. Whereas both fathers and mothers deal with feeling 
in feminine culture (Paul, Costa, Antonio Terracciano & Robert 2001). Indeed, these views are 
supported by recent empirical studies, where findings show that women are significantly 
competitive in matrilineal societies, whereas in patriarchal societies women do not self-select in 
competition (see Gneezy, Kenneth, &List 2008; Gneezy, Leonard, & List 2009; Anderson, Ertac, 
Gneezy, List, & Maximiano 2013). Likewise, a study by Booth and Nolan (2012), but this time 
with youths, demonstrate that girls from single-sex schools in the United Kingdom are more prone 
to compete than girls from co-educational schools.  
3.4 Effects of risk tolerance in competition 
Scholars also examine gender differences in competition by testing both men’s and 
women’s decision-making behavior when it comes to risks. Previous surveys of economics by 
Eckel and Grossman (2008c) and psychology by Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) report the 
same conclusion: “women are more risk averse than men in the vast majority of environments and 
tasks. Men and women tend to perceive and attach different meaning to risks”. Croson & Gneezy 
(2009) argue that men and women differ in their emotional reaction to uncertain situations and this 
differential emotional reaction results in differences in risk taking. Men are also more confident 
than women and, as a result, have a different perception of the probability distribution underlying 
a given risk. Moreover, men tend to view risky situations as challenges as opposed to threats, 
which lead to increased risk tolerance.  
3.5 Are women competitive at all? 
Although most findings from the literature result in men being more competitive than 
women, it does not therefore mean that women are not competitive. Navaro & Schwartzberg 
(2008) argue that women have always been competitive, but the focus of that competition has 
previously been on getting and keeping a man, being a favored child, or gaining the admiration or 
approval of others through traditional feminine tasks. Indeed, few studies, however, demonstrate 
that women perform best when competing in all women teams against all men teams, whereas men 
perform best in mixed teams (Gneezy, Niderle, & Rustichini 2003: Stenzel & Kubler 2005).  
 3.6 Effects of size in competition and Individual vs. Team competition 
  A recent study by Hanek and Tor (2016) shows that the size of the competition is a crucial 
factor in determining whether individuals select into competition or not. Using different sized 
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firms; they find that women, relative to men, prefer to enter smaller competition compared with 
larger competition. In assessing the gender competition gap, some studies use different terms under 
which competitions are performed. For example, Healy and Pate (2011), attempt to ascertain the 
effect that team competition has on gender disparities. In their studies, they have an individual- 
competition sessions and also sessions where individuals compete in two-person teams. Compared 
to the individual-competition sessions, the findings reveal that the gender competition gap in the 
team sessions is only one-third as large. Moreover, the findings indicated that relative to men, 
women preferred to compete more in teams than as individuals. 
 3.7 Effects of incentives in competition 
 According to Atkinson (1966) the value of incentive is the relative attractiveness of 
success on a task given. It represents the relative attractiveness of a particular goal that is offered 
in a situation. Drawing on the evolutionary theory, Cassar, Wordofa & Zhang (2016) introduce an 
additional and new incentive, which shows that once the incentive is switched from monetary to a 
child benefitting reward, gender differences in competition disappear. Women therefore become 
as competitive as men.  
To date, through the various channels of understanding the gender gap, it can be observed 
that culture attribution of roles and how it defines them play some significant parts in individual 
life. Thus, inspired by Cassar, Wordofa & Zhang (2016)’s work, in this paper, we will be 
replicating their experiment but in a different environment, in order to examine if this method of 
change in incentives hold in the Togolese society. Moreover, we will examine whether women in 
patriarchal society are less competitive. Another way this research also assesses these continuing 
disparities is also by examining each genders’ behavior through individual income. Schultz (1980) 
argues that poor people are no less concerned about improving their lot and of their children than 
people who have more income. Mullainathann and Shafir (2015) explain this behavior from the 
poor by advancing the concept that poverty taxes the mind of the disadvantaged. Further, they 
argue that along the obvious difficulty of not having enough time, money or food to meet goals, 
the feeling of scarcity drains the mental energy. As a result, the poor’s cognitive capacity is reduced 
leaving him/her prone to a host of bad outcomes. Thus, since competition is regarded as the way 
to success on the labor market, will the poor be willing to compete? 
The methods used in past studies to measure the willingness to compete of individuals 
varies from one environment to the others, and also on the ages of the subjects.  
 10 
4. Methodology 
The primary objective of this study is to determine whether women are as competitive as men 
and if their competitive participation increases when they are presented with non- monetary 
rewards. Further, we examine three other factors: whether being a parent, in a polygamous 
marriage, and having a high income impact individuals’ decision in entering competition. Thus 
the hypotheses in this paper are the following: 
I.  Women become competitive as men when the incentive lies with children’s well-
being.  
II. Female parents are more likely to compete.  
III. Individuals in polygamous marriages are more likely to compete. 
IV. Individuals with high income are more likely to compete. 
Competitiveness can be complex to evaluate but there is substantial literature that uses several 
distinctive approaches to measure the competitive levels of specific sectors and environments. This 
study utilizes the innovative incentives tracking method postulated by Cassar, Wordofa & Zhang 
(2016) to measure competition.  
6.  Data 
The data for this study is collected in Togo, West Africa. The data collection is done in two 
rounds (summer 2016 & winter 2017). It is important to mention that though the data are collected 
from the same population, the characteristics of the participants in the first data collection differ 
in terms of cultural values from the participants in the second data collection. The first round of 
data collection consists of 243 participants, of whom 117 women and 126 men. Regrouping both 
parents and non-parents, the experiment was divided in 15 sessions. The second round of data 
collection, which is also from the society, includes 185 -94 females and 89 males’ participants. All 
of the participants recorded in this data are parents. For both experiments, participants were 
recruited by means of announcements made on national radios, and in schools. 
7.   Experimental Design 
As mentioned earlier, the experiment in this study is used to provide insights that determine 
whether gender differences in competitive choices exist when incentives differ. Thus, the same 
experimental protocol is used in the collection of the two different data. The vouchers in these 
experiments are children’s school supplies and children’s clothing. The experiment consists of six 
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activities, and a survey, which is filled out by the same participants at the end. After the completion 
of the survey, participants in each session, were asked to select one individual among themselves 
to randomly draw which of the six activities they will be paid on, plus the show up fee of 1500 
CFA. In addition, an experimental income is selected randomly of 500 CFA(rich), and 100 CFA 
(poor) are given to participants before the beginning of each section. Participants’ performances 
determined their payout, therefore they were strongly encouraged to do their best in each activity. 
Depending on how many people were in a section, and their ability to read and write, the longest 
section lasted about two and a half hours. 
At the beginning of the activities, all participants were asked to randomly pick their 
experimental income, which determined their financial status. Participants were told that the 
starting amount was not the same within the group, however every participant’s initial income 
remained confidential. This was done to avoid the effects of any other factors on income. Thus, 
this experiment consists of four different participant groups (see Table 1). There are two incentives 
to the experiment: cash and voucher. In the first four stages, participants are asked to solve some 
arithmetic questions within three minutes, without using a calculator. The questions involved the 
additions of three digit numbers, for example: 30+19+45=? There are 25 questions on each sheet. 
In the fifth stage, participants’ risk behavior is measured on a scale of 1 to 6 (1 being no risky and 
6 being very risky). Participants are each given six different tickets, and are asked to make a choice. 
In the six round, participants’ valuation of the non-monetary reward is measured, through a 
question based on the value of the non-monetary goods. This round is to see whether men and 
women value the voucher equally or not. In the final round, participants are given a list of questions 
which elicit control for variables such as age, head of household gender, and marital status. The 
last three rounds do not have any time constraint. And most importantly the order of the activities 
is kept the same in all the sections. Participants are allowed to only look at their own scores, and 
are not given the scores of their opponents.   
5. Model  
In this paper we are using the ordinary least square estimation. The model consists of a 
binary dependent variable, where I analyze a women’s level of participation in competitive 
environments under two different treatments (money and voucher incentives treatments). The 
baseline regression of the experiment is the same in Cassar, Wordofa & Zhang (2016):  
• 1. (Choiceit) = β0 + β1 Treatmentt+ β2Femalei + β3 Femalei*Treatmentt+ β4 
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Exp.Incomei +β4 Confidence + β5 WTPi+ β6Risk Tolerancei+ β7 X +εi  
Equation 1 represents the panel estimation, where the dependent variable Choiceit is a dummy; 
representing 0 if a participant chooses not to compete and 1 if he/she chooses to compete under 
the given treatment. Treatmentt is a dummy variable which is 1 for the voucher-round, and 0 for 
the cash-round. Confidence is obtained by subtracting participants’ own score during the 
compulsory tournament game (Round 2) from the score they guessed their opponents received in 
the same round. Willingness To Pay (WTPi) is measured from a question based on the use of the 
non-monetary goods to each participant; on a scale of 1-4 (1 being very useful, and 4 not useful). 
Risk Tolerancei is measured through 6 different tickets given to each participant (1 being not risky 
and 6 very risky). These controls are consistent with the factors the literature suggests to affect a 
person’s decision to enter competition. In addition, the X controls for other variables such as age, 
marital status, education level, and parental status.  
8. Results 
8.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary of the combination of the pooled dataset. I present some 
information drawn from the survey, which includes queries on gender, age, level of education, 
marital status, and parental status. For females, the average participant is in the 15 to 72-year-old 
range, which is similar to the average male participant. 70 percent of females report to be parents 
compare to 55 percent of males. On average male participants have higher educational attainment 
relative to the female participants. Although females on average report to have more fulltime jobs 
compared to males, there is not a significant difference and these same findings are true for the 
polygamy variable.   
The panel in Table 3 provides summaries of the performances; correct answers found 
during the activities, the risk tolerance, willingness to pay of the participants, and the choices of 
the participants. Figure 1 to 4 complement these data summaries with visual depictions of the 
observed results. In terms of performances both genders’ scores are closer to each other across the 
various groups, except in the tournament and cash-round activities, where males scores are slightly 
higher than female scores. The confidence level is negative for both genders, but not significant. 
 As Figure 3 highlights, in the cash-round, 43% of males on average are likely to compete 
compared to 41% of females. However, in the voucher-round, the percentage of males willing to 
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compete slightly decreases to 39%, while the percentage of females remains at 41%.  However, 
the results become more interesting when we observe the data from non-parent and parent views. 
In the cash-round, female parents reveal to be as competitive as the male parents, where 51% of 
the mothers chose to compete relative to 46% of fathers. Unlike the cash-round, the percentage of 
fathers willing to compete in the voucher-round decreases to 40%, while mothers’ percentages stay 
the same (p-value=0.04). Though we observe the same patterns in the case of the non-parent male 
and female participants, the percentage of males who chose to compete is still higher than the 
females who chose to compete.  
Observing the participants’ willingness to compete based on their marital union, either in 
a polygamous marriage or not, we note that both females and males in polygamous unions are 
more competitive relative to the ones in monogamous unions. It is important to comment that the 
percentage of males in polygamous marriages who chose to compete is just slightly higher than 
the ones’ in monogamous marriages who choose to compete. The dramatic change is observed on 
the females’ side, where the percentage of females in polygamous marriages who chose to compete 
increases by 11% in the cash-round compared to the females in monogamous marriages. 
From the income perspective, we see that poor people tend to more competitive compared 
to rich people. But, these results are not significant.  
Though the raw data summaries provide some evidence that behavior varies across both 
gender groups and within the society, there has been no attempt to control for observables, which 
might influence behavior and performances. To address this issue, we regress the individual 
participant’s choice to compete on a dummy variable of gender, treatment, their interaction, and 
the observables presented in Table 2.  
1. Empirical Results  
1.1. Whole Dataset results 
The empirical results from several specifications are displayed in Table 4. The results are an 
analysis from both datasets combined. The first specification (S1) is considered as the baseline 
measurement, including only variables that provide an unconditional effect of gender in the 
designed competitive environment. Plus, other considered influential factors, the fifth specification 
(S5), adds the introduced variable of experimental income, which is expected to also influence 
competitive tendencies. Irrespective of the number of controls in the specifications, the empirical 
results show that females on average are less likely to compete than males, and these results are 
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significant in S (2) to S (6). Under the voucher treatment, the signs of the coefficients become 
positive, meaning women become competitive when the reward favors their children, the 
coefficients are not significant. Supporting the previous findings, the regression results show that 
female parents are most competitive. Both male and female participants in this society are risk 
tolerant.   
8.2 Subset Dataset results 
 Table 5 displays the specifications on the subset of the data, where we collected information on 
polygamy. In the second specification, the result shows that females are competitive. However, 
these results lose the significance when other observables are added to the regression. Results on 
female parents are significant, showing that they are competitive. Both females and males in 
polygamy marriages are competitive.  
Conclusion 
Several recent experimental studies show the link between gender and competition. This study is 
an extension of a previous work by Cassar, Wordofa and Zhang (2016). This work uses an 
incentivized experimental task to explore whether there are gender differences in selecting into 
competitive environments when the incentive changes from cash to voucher. In addition, we also 
measure the effects of income, marriage type, and being a parent on people’s willingness to 
compete.  This society is unique in the sense that though it is a patriarchal, we find some group of 
women who “degender” themselves to take on masculine roles in order to be successful. The data 
show some interesting results. The results show that both men and women have similar 
performances in the activities. It is important to note that these activities are mathematical 
activities, which are found in the previous literature to hinder the willingness to compete of 
women. Furthermore, the findings reveal that female parents are willing to compete regardless of 
the incentives. These findings are consistent with the study from China by Cassar, Wordofa and 
Zhang (2016) work, where they find that mothers are competitive when the incentive benefit their 
children.  
 Fine Cordelia (2017) argues, people tend to overestimate these differences in competition 
and therefore underestimate the value of environmental factors, such as rearing conditions, 
ecological resources and social conditions: that is, the nurture side of the nature-nurture debate. 
From this study, it can be observed that the society in which the participants live have an 
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important impact on their willingness to compete. Although the Togolese is a patriarchal, both 
genders have the same level of willingness to compete under both cash and voucher incentives. 
However, the behavior of the female parents to more competitive can be the result of the 
“Nanas” in the society, who have and continue to show great success examples. Therefore, a 
woman willingness to compete should not just be perceived based on the just the task, but also 
on the environment and situation this latter happens to find herself. Maybe cultural norms need 
to be revised in order to examine how with globalization and others, the woman evolve and adapt 
to situations. In the Togolese society, it can be inferred that the “Nana Benz” are aspiration 
windows to other women to be competitive.  
 Some policy implications from this study, are that women parents will be better off and 
more represented in on the formal labor force if some kind of help to their offspring is provided 
to them for example children day cares. The findings from this study have also shown that 
although most of these women are uneducated, they are however competitive. It will be 
interesting if people without certain education can be given the opportunity to grow, through 
some special training provided to them by their government. Finally but not last, since mothers 
seems to be more competitive, other incentives such as flexible working hours and also on 
maternity leaves could be of good outcomes.   
 
 Although the resulting patterns of this study show some potential insights into underlying 
sources of the perceived gender differences within this society, it is necessary to note that we 
sampled a limited number of areas and moreover, notice though the data is collected within the 
same society, we have seen earlier that several important factors vary across groups within the 
same environment.   
  
  
 16 
References 
Fine, C. (2017). Testosterone rex: myths of sex, science, and society. New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc.R. (2015, April 30). 2014 
 Catalyst Census: Women Board Directors. Retrieved April 10, 2017, 
fromhttp://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2014-catalyst-census-women-board-directors 
African Queens of Textiles: the Nana Benz of Togo. (2012, February 23). Retrieved April 10, 
2017, from https://afrolegends.com/2012/02/21/african-queens-of-textiles-the-nana-benz-
of-togo/ 
Andersen, S., Ertac, S., Gneezy, U., List, J. A., & Maximiano, S. (2013). Gender, 
Competitiveness, and Socialization at a Young Age: Evidence From a Matrilineal and a 
Patriarchal Society. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1438-1443. 
Doi:10.1162/rest_a_00312Booth, A. L., & Nolen, P. (2012).  
Gender differences in risk behavior: does nurture matter? The Economic Journal, 122(558). 
Doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011. 02480.x 
Bussey, K., & Bandura, A. (1999). Social cognitive theory of gender development and 
differentiation. Psychological Review, 106(4), 676-713. Doi:10.1037//0033-
295x.106.4.676 
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125(3), 367-383. Doi:10.1037//0033-2909.125.3.367 
Cassar, A., Wordofa, F., & Zhang, Y. J. (2016). Competing for the benefit of offspring 
eliminates the gender gap in competitiveness. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 113(19), 5201-5205. Doi:10.1073/pnas.1520235113 
Chafetz, J. S., & Rhode, D. L. (1991). Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference. 
Contemporary Sociology, 20(2), 185. Doi:10.2307/2072890 
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender Differences in Preferences. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 47(2), 448-474. Doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.448 
Cuddy, A. J., Wolf, E. B., Glick, P., Crotty, S., Chong, J., & Norton, M. I. (2015). Men as 
cultural ideals: Cultural values moderate gender stereotype content. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 109(4), 622-635. Doi:10.1037/pspi0000027 
 17 
Cárdenas, J., Dreber, A., Essen, E. V., & Ranehill, E. (2012). Gender differences in 
competitiveness and risk taking: Comparing children in Colombia and Sweden. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1), 11-23. Doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.008 
Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. By Charles Darwin ... 
doi: 10.5962/bhl.title.24784 
Dreber, A., Essen, E. V., & Ranehill, E. (2013). Gender and competition in adolescence: task 
matters. Experimental Economics, 17(1), 154-172. Doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9361-
0Gneezy, U., Niederle, M., & Rustichini, A. (2003). Performance in Competitive 
Environments: Gender Differences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 1049-
1074. Doi:10.1162/00335530360698496 
Gneezy, U., Niederle, M., & Rustichini, A. (2003). Performance in Competitive Environments: 
Gender Differences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 1049-1074. 
Doi:10.1162/00335530360698496Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2004). Gender and 
Competition at a Young Age. American Economic Review, 94(2), 377-381. 
Doi:10.1257/0002828041301821 
Gneezy, U., Leonard, K., & List, J. (2008). Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a 
Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society. Doi:10.3386/w13727 
Gneezy, U., Leonard, K., & List, J. (2008). Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a 
Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society. Doi:10.3386/w13727Goerg, O., & Coquery-
Vidrovitch, C. (1994). Histoire des villes d’Afrique noire. Des 17oloniz a la 
17olonization. Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, (42), 131. Doi:10.2307/3771227 
Gredler, G. R. (2000). Golombok, S., & Fivush, R. (1994). Gender development. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 275 pp., $22.75. Psychology in the Schools, 37(4), 394-395. 
Doi:10.1002/1520-6807(200007)37:4<394::aid-pits14>3.0.co;2-9Hamilton, J. O. (1974). 
Motivation and risk taking behavior: A test of Atkinson’s theory. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 29(6), 856-864. Doi:10.1037/h0036463 
Hanek, K. J., Garcia, S. M., & Tor, A. (2016). Gender and competitive preferences: The role of 
competition size. Journal of Applied Psychology, 101(8), 1122-1133. 
Doi:10.1037/apl0000112 
Healy, A., & Pate, J. (2011). Can Teams Help to Close the Gender Competition Gap? The 
Economic Journal, 121(555), 1192-1204. Doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010. 02409.x 
 18 
Heilman, M. E., & Alcott, V. B. (2001). What I think you think of me: Women’s reactions to 
being viewed as beneficiaries of preferential selection. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
86(4), 574-582. Doi:10.1037/0021-9010.86.4.574 
Heilman, M. E., Wallen, A. S., Fuchs, D., & Tamkins, M. M. (2004). Penalties for Success: 
Reactions to Women Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 89(3), 416-427. Doi:10.1037/0021-9010.89.3.416 
Hofstede, G. (1998). Think Locally, Act Globally: Cultural Constraints in Personnel 
Management. Management and International Review, 7-26. Doi:10.1007/978-3-322-
90989-3_2Ivanova-Stenzel, R., & Kübler, D. (2011). Gender differences in team work 
and team competition. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 797-808. Doi: 
10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.011 
Knight, J. (2002). Sexual stereotypes. Nature, 415(6869), 254-256. Doi:10.1038/415254a 
Markus, H., & Oyserman, D. (1989). Gender and Thought: The Role of the Self-Concept. 
Gender and Thought: Psychological Perspectives, 100-127. Doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-
3588-0_6 
Martinsson, P., Nordblom, K., Rützler, D., & Sutter, M. (2011). Social preferences during 
childhood and the role of gender and age — An experiment in Austria and Sweden. 
Economics Letters, 110(3), 248-251. Doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.028 
Meyer-Bahlburg, H. F., Feldman, J. F., Ehrhardt, A. A., & Cohen, P. (1984). Effects of prenatal 
hormone exposure versus pregnancy complications on sex-dimorphic behavior. Archives 
of Sexual Behavior, 13(5), 479-495. Doi:10.1007/bf01541431 
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men 
Compete Too Much? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 1067-1101. 
Doi:10.1162/qjec.122.3.1067 
Nosek, B. A., & Smyth, F. L. (2011). Implicit Social Cognitions Predict Sex Differences in Math 
Engagement and Achievement. American Educational Research Journal, 48(5), 1125-
1156. Doi:10.3102/0002831211410683 
Paul, J. C., Terracciano, A., & Mccrae, R. R. (2001). Gender differences in personality traits 
across cultures: Robust and surprising findings. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(2), 322-331. Doi:10.1037//0022-3514.81.2.322 
 19 
Rivière, C. 1978. “Rumeur de metamorphose.” Ethnopsychologie 33 (1) (January–March) : 55–
80 
Rudman, L. A., & Glick, P. (2001). Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward 
Agentic Women. Journal of Social Issues, 57(4), 743-762. Doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00239 
Schultz, T. W. (1980). Nobel Lecture: The Economics of Being Poor. Journal of Political 
Economy, 88(4), 639-651. Doi:10.1086/260895Shah, A. K., Shafir, E., & Mullainathan, 
S. (2015). Scarcity Frames Value. Psychological Science, 26(4), 402-412. 
Doi:10.1177/0956797614563958Toulabor, C. (2012). Les Nana Benz de Lomé. Afrique 
contemporaine, 244(4), 69. Doi:10.3917/afco.244.0069 
Tregenza, T., & Wedell, N. (2002). Polyandrous females avoid costs of inbreeding. Nature, 
415(6867), 71-73. Doi:10.1038/415071aTrivers, R. L. (n.d.). Foreword by Robert L. 
Trivers. Sexual Selection in Primates, Ix-Xii. Doi:10.1017/cbo9780511542459.001 
Udry, J. R. (1994). The Nature of Gender. Demography, 31(4), 561. Doi:10.2307/2061790Ward, 
P. I., Wedell, N., Hosken, D. J., & Tregenza, T. (2002). Measuring the sperm competition 
successes of field males of the yellow dung fly. Ecological Entomology, 27(6), 763-765. 
Doi:10.1046/j.1365-2311.2002. 00463.x 
West, M. (2008). Envy, Competition and Gender – Theory, Clinical Applications and Group 
Work, by Navaro, Leyla & Schwartzberg, Sharan. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 
53(1), 138-140. Doi:10.1111/j.1468-5922.2007.00705_3.x 
 
 20 
 
Figure 1. Performances graphs  
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Figure 2. Beliefs graphs 
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Figure 3. Choices graphs (whole data) 
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Figure 4. Choices graphs of parents 
 
 
Figure 5. Choices graphs based om marriage type 
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Figure 6. Choices graphs based income 
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Table 2: Descriptive summary statistics  
Means with standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, and p-value  
Individual Characteristics Female Male p-value 
 mean sd min max Observations mean sd min max Observations  
Age 33.343 12.887 15 72 210 32.443 12.548 15 72 219 0.464 
Marital Status 0.432 0.497 0 1 213 0.439 0.497 0 1 221 0.884 
Parents 0.704 0.457 0 1 213 0.545 0.499 0 1 222 0.001*** 
Education Level 2.854 0.789 1 4 206 3.355 0.672 1 4 217 0.000*** 
Work Status 2.978 1.820 0 1 185 3.199 1.939 0 1 191 0.257 
Experimental Income 0.486 0.501 0 1 212 0.493 0.501 0 1 221 0.879 
Polygamy 0.333 0.474 0 1 78 0.241 0.430 0 1 87 0.194 
Age denotes chronological age in years; marital status denotes whether the individual is single or married; parent 
denotes whether the individual has a child or not; education denotes the level of education acquired by an individual; 
work status denotes whether the individual has a full time job or is unemployed; experimental income denotes 
whether the individual is rich or poor; polygamy denotes whether the individual is in a polygamous marriage or not.  
  
 26 
 
Table 3: Descriptive summary statistics 
Participant Choices 
Mean with standard deviation in parentheses, and p-value 
      
Experiment summary Pooled Men Observations Pooled Women Observations p-value 
      
Piece Rate score 4.968 444 4.798 426 0.372 
 2.984  2.621   
Tournament score 6.25 440 5.92 426 0.116* 
 3.241  2.91   
Cash-round score 6.631 444 6.146 426 0.016** 
 2.996  2.938   
Voucher-round score 6.882 444 6.873 426 0.966 
 3.406  3.229   
Confidence -0.466 438 -0.924 422 0.163 
 4.761  4.873   
Risk Tolerance in Cash 3.159 440 3.066 422 0.428 
 1.647  1.783   
Risk Tolerance in Voucher 4.173 162 4.655 168 0.000*** 
 1.156  1.223   
Willingness to pay 0.751 378 0.846 338 0.002*** 
 0.433  0.361   
Choice in cash-round 0.428 444 0.413 426 0.659 
 0.495  0.493   
Choice in voucher-round 0.387 444 0.408 426 0.526 
 0.488  0.492   
Piece rate score denotes the score of the individual in the first activity; tournament score denotes the score of the 
individual in the second activity; cash-round score denotes the individual score in the third activity; voucher-round 
score individual score in the fourth activity; risk tolerance in cash denotes the individual risk preference in cash; risk 
tolerance in voucher denotes the individual risk preference in voucher; willingness to pay denotes the individual use 
of the voucher, choice in cash-round denotes whether the individual choose to compete in the cash-round; choice in 
voucher-round denotes whether the individual choose to compete in the voucher-round. 
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Table 4 
Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES choice choice choice choice choice choice choice choice choice 
      CASH VOUCHER MALE FEMALE 
Female -0.02 -0.20*** -0.15** -0.16** -0.16** -0.15* -0.11   
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)   
Parent 0.16*** 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.21*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) 
Female*Parent  0.25*** 0.22*** 0.21** 0.21** 0.22** 0.12   
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)   
Treatment -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04   -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) 
Female*Voucher  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03     
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)     
Tournament   0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.02 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Risk Tolerance   0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.03 0.09*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Confidence   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Willingness for voucher       -0.06   
       (0.07)   
Marital Status    -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.12* -0.02 -0.05 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) 
Education    -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Experimental Income     -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
     (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female*Experimental Income     0.01 -0.03 0.01   
     (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)   
Constant 0.33*** 0.40*** 0.08 0.26* 0.27* 0.16 0.30* 0.39** 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
          
Observations 870 870 856 832 828 414 346 424 404 
Number of id 435 435 428 416 414   212 202 
R-squared      0.16 0.10   
The dependent variable is choice, and it takes on a value of 1 if the participant opted to compete an 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Estimates are computed from the ordinary least squared models. Variables 
are defined in the Table II & III footnote.  
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Table 5 
Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES choice choice choice choice choice choice choice choice choice choice 
         MALE FEMALE 
Female 0.22***   0.21*** -0.63* -0.62* -0.39 -0.44   
 (0.07)   (0.07) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)   
Polygamy  0.15**  0.11 -0.62 -0.63 -0.44 -0.46 0.04 0.04 
  (0.08)  (0.07) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.11) (0.11) 
Parent   0.19 0.14 -0.21 -0.21 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.64** 
   (0.17) (0.16) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.31) 
Female*Parent     0.84** 0.84** 0.62* 0.67*   
     (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)   
Female*Polygamy     0.08 0.08 0.02 -0.01   
     (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)   
Parent*Polygamy     0.71 0.71 0.52 0.53   
     (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47)   
Treatment      -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 
      (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Female*Voucher      -0.01 -0.03 -0.03   
      (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)   
Tournament       0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 0.03 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk Tolerance       0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 
       (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Confidence       0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age        -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Marital Status        0.01 0.12 -0.03 
        (0.08) (0.16) (0.10) 
Education        -0.07 -0.00 -0.11 
        (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) 
Constant 0.44*** 0.50*** 0.36** 0.28* 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.12 0.43 0.13 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.21) (0.28) (0.34) (0.39) (0.46) 
           
Observations 330 334 334 330 330 330 320 314 166 148 
Number of id 165 167 167 165 165 165 160 157 83 74 
The dependent variable is choice, and it takes on a value of 1 if the participant opted to compete an 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Estimates are computed from the ordinary least squared models. Variables 
are defined in the Table II & III footnote.  
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Appendix: 
Table 1: Groups of participants 
 Men Women 
rich men rich women rich 
poor men poor women poor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
